Danger At Sea

The Obama Administration responded to critics of its downsized military budget (see NY Analysis, 2/23/12) with statements that it was maintaining resources on the most likely threats, especially in the Pacific region.  It pledged to provide adequate funding both to protect U.S. interests and reassure America’s allies.  To accomplish this, the White House emphasized that the Navy would be given preferential treatment.

Concerns for maintaining the size of the fleet include not only the traditional challenges faced by America’s seagoing defense, but the highly worrisome naval power China has developed over the past decade.

Details indicate that the Navy was not spared, after all.  President Obama is calling for a 1.7% reduction from the Navy’s 2012 baseline appropriation, according to The Navy Times.  Starting with force numbers that are drastically reduced (down from 600 ships in the 1990’s to just 284 currently) the Navy will likely see further cuts in projected replacement and modernization programs. Additionally, accounting gimmicks are used that will provide “long term delays” rather than cancellation of new construction. This allows the Administration to respond to critics who say that the force has become too small by saying that replacement programs remain alive, even though they are extensively delayed. Despite assurances, the fleet size, under the current budget, could actually shrink to about 280 by 2017. 

Despite widespread agreement that a 313 ship force is the bare minimum necessary for the Navy to protect the U.S., the current budget pegs the maritime force at only 280--285 vessels through the next five years.  Even that figure can’t be guaranteed, since age, accident, or hostile action could produce losses. 16 planned ships will be cut from the five year budget plan. According to a Navy League Report, a 20% cut in the number of warships scheduled to be built is planned. Further, according to the Department of Defense, procurement of the F-35 Fighter aircraft will be reduced by “nearly 50%,” in addition to the elimination of six Marine TACair squardrons. The need to replace the Navy’s aging fighter aircraft was recently emphasized by the crash of an F-18 F/A in Virginia, a disaster that early reports indicate may be due to the advances age of the aircraft.

To soften the public relations impact of cuts to a force that even the President emphasized needed to be protected from the budget crisis, each reduction is rationalized with accounting techniques that term the changes mere delays.  Examples from the Department of Defenses’ related budget proposal statement include:

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           The ordering date of the planned aircraft carrier (CVN 79) hasn’t changed, but “The construction schedule will be moved back two years.”

·       Landing Craft Assault class vessels will (eventually) remain the same in number, but “procurement will be slowed.”

·       Amphibious Assault Ship (LHA) construction will be moved from FY 2016 to 2017.

·       The guided missile cruiser force won’t be cut—but nine ships will be “retired early.”

·       The development program for OHIO class subs will continue, “but at reduced levels.”

An objective analysis of the threat level justifies a fully funded Navy.  The Congressional Research Services’(CRS) recent report, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities, stresses that Beijing’s maritime modernization effort “has emerged as a key issue in U.S. defense planning.  The question is of particular importance to the U.S. Navy, because many U.S. military programs for countering improved Chinese military forces would fall within the Navy’s budget.”

China’s submarine force is nearly double that of America’s. By 2015, its total fleet will be larger than that of the U.S. Navy.  Chinese naval units have already harassed US Navy vessels.  While Washington discusses how deep to cut the defense budget, China continues its pattern of increasing spending by an average of 16.2% annually, according to the Asian Defence publication. That figure may only be the tip of the iceberg. The Pentagon has charged Beijing with hiding its real military spending. The CRS noted that even “in the absence of …conflict, the U.S.-Chinese military balance in the Pacific could nevertheless influence day-to-day choices made by other Pacific countries, including on whether to align their policies more closely with China or the United States.”

China began its ambitious naval modernization in the 1990s.  Sinodefence reports that the 225,000 man “People’s Liberation Army Navy” is organized into three fleets: North Sea, East Sea, and South Sea.  Each consists of surface and submarine forces, naval aviation, and coastal defense forces.

Beijing’s effort has been successful in every way.  Powerful and effective anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), submarines, and surface ships have been developed, along with well trained, highly professional and capable crews. 

The high caliber and impressive size of Beijing’s naval force clearly indicates that its goals extend beyond mere self defense and the imposition of its claims against Taiwan.  They include  China’s expansive and controversial claims far beyond its legitimate borders, the expansion of its international influence, and the solidifying of its role as a global superpower, particularly in the Pacific, where, according to CRS, it seeks to displace U.S. influence.  The Department of Defense notes that “China’s rise as a major international actor is likely to stand out as the defining feature of the strategic landscape of the 21^st Century.”  While serving as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen  noted in June of 2010 that he was “genuinely concerned” about Beijing’s military might. 

China’s technologically advanced naval weaponry combined with its aggressive posture render  it a greater threat to the U.S. than that of the former Soviet navy.  Devices than can disable seaborne electronics from a significant distance, as well as its development of revolutionary “anti ship ballistic missiles,” combined with satellites that provide excellent targeting data, give Beijing the tools to win conflicts at sea, when combined with China’s growing conventional navy.

China has developed its naval power to achieve a number of goals.  In addition to supplanting U.S. influence at sea and intimidating Taiwan, it has committed incursions into Japanese waters, and laid claim to oceanic resources of several other nations such as Vietnam, the Philippines, South Korea and India.  Recently, a worried South Korean military official was quoted in The Chosun Iibo, noting: “We need to establish a new security strategy by looking into a wide range of military partnerships with China as well as strengthening our alliance with the U.S.”  (The China Reform Monitor  reports that China will include Leo Island, controlled by South Korea, in its regular maritime patrols, and would deploy its first aircraft carrier there in August.)

Undisputedly, America’s maritime interests and those of its allies are clearly endangered by China’s dynamic new naval might.  The White House publicly recognizes the threat, but has failed to fulfill its commitment to counter it with adequate resources.